WORKING WITHOUT A LICENSE – CALIF. COURTS APPLY A HARSHER INTERPRETATION STANDARD THAN FOR
ACCESSORY TO A MURDER
Is the purpose of courts to interpret laws
so they are harsh and unfair?
If a court can interpret legislation to be enforced
such that it is “harsh and unfair”, or choose to interpret the same
legislation’s actual wording so that it’s application is more in line with equity
to the working person, ensuring quality work, and deterring fraud, you would
think they would not go with “harsh and unfair”.
Wrong: at least in the context of
unlicensed contractors. In one
California Court of Appeals case (Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Design
(2010) 183 Cal. App. 4th 656) (“Alatriste”) and two cases that
echoed it, the court deliberately chose an interpretation not in the text, that
the court itself called harsh and unfair.
As I mentioned in a blog a few days ago, an employee
who wields a wrench, or shovels dirt in creating new landscaping, is entitled
to an extensive degree of protection in the form of rules for lunch breaks,
rest breaks, regular pay, overtime pay, a hearing conducted and decided by the agency
enforcing the law, and a court procedure designed to scare off the employer or
label him/her/it “wage thief” if he or she does not prevail.
But pick up the same wrench to unplug a sink, or shovel
the same soil for landscaping work if you are working independently but not
licensed as a handyman/plumber or landscaper respectively, then you are
violating Penal Code § 7028: acting in the capacity of a contractor without a
license. The Courts will then rule that your
customer may demand back your ‘wages’, and the value of every item for which the
customer advanced the cost. If the
demand is made in court, the worker is forbidden all avenues of defense. He cannot even argue that the customer knew
he could do this from the start. If it
costs you, the unlicensed worker, bankruptcy including loss of home and life
savings, tough.
The “shield”
California has long had a law (Business and
Professions Code 7031) preventing an unlicensed contractor from enforcing a
contract to collect money due to him or her.
Now, as paragraph “a” of section
7031, it reads:
“…no
person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may
bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any
court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of
any act or contract where a license is required by this chapter without
alleging that he or she was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the
performance of that act or contract regardless of the merits of the cause of
action brought by the person…”
This language is prohibitive. The unlicensed “contractor” cannot make a
claim for payment he or she regards as due.
In normal contract
disputes, a party seeking payment, even if the contract is invalid, can assert “equitable claims”. These include “unjust enrichment” if the
other party has gained something for nothing, or quantum meruit requiring reasonable payment for work the
Customer has ordered. Here section
7031 “a” bars these claims.
However, there was an
important limit to the “shield”. It put the
burden on the customer to stop paying the unlicensed worker. At that point the unlicensed worker would,
if he or she had any sense, stop working, because the worker could not make a legal
claim for payment.
Turning the “shield” into a club.
It was arguable under
the terms of paragraph “a” that if a contractor, could allege that he got his
license, or got it renewed, and that after that his actions were performed while
licensed, he should get paid for those licensed “acts”. Such a limitation would make sense if the
purpose of the law was understood to be to get all work done by licensees while
they were licensed in order to protect the public from shoddy work and to remove
competitions with licensees. Indeed,
these are the only reasonable purposes. This interpretation was turned down by the
State Supreme Court.
In a case with the issue
of a contractor licensed part of the time of the ongoing job the court found:
(1) Where applicable, section 7031(a) bars a person from
suing to recover compensation for any work he or she did under an agreement for
services requiring a contractor's license unless proper licensure was in place
at all times during such contractual performance. (2) Section 7031(a) does not
allow a contractor who was unlicensed at any time during contractual
performance nonetheless to recover compensation for individual acts performed
while he or she was duly licensed.
…“This rule is based on the rationale that ‘the public
importance of discouraging such prohibited transactions outweighs equitable
considerations of possible injustice between the parties.’
MW Erectors, Inc. v.
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc.
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 412 (“MW Erectors”)
Temporizing, the Court
added:
“….[C]ourts will not, under such circumstances, extend the harsh
sanction of forfeiture beyond the bounds set by the Legislature absent a
showing that such a result is essential to effectuate the statute's protective
purposes.”
It should be a source of
alarm to find the California Supreme Court interpreting law in order to justify
“possible injustice”, (actual injustice).
The legislature adds a “sword”
The legislature amended the law around 2010 to
add a paragraph “b” that reads:
“…[A] person who utilizes
the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation paid to the
unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract.”
This addition threw the balance against the unlicensed
independent worker who now could be sued to claw back everything for which she
already had been paid while the worker was still prohibited from seeking any
payment due.
Limits in words describing the “sword”
Note, though that the
language is different between the two paragraphs:
·
Paragraph “a” prohibits an action to collect for work not yet
paid, and quite possibly not yet performed “regardless of the merits of the cause of action brought by the
person…” Paragraph “b” says the Customer may bring an
action but incorporates no language limiting defenses.
·
Paragraph “a” prohibits “collection of compensation for the
performance of any act or contract where a license is required by this chapter
without alleging that he or she was a duly licensed contractor at all times
during the performance of that act or contract”. Paragraph “b” permits a suit to recover
“all compensation paid to
the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or contract”. Paragraph
“b” thus lacks the “at all
times”
provision tarring the worker throughout the whole period of the job.
·
Paragraph “a” bars a claim for “…compensation for the performance of any act or contract…” while paragraph b permits the claim to recover
all compensation “…paid to
the unlicensed contractor…” saying nothing about
permission to sue to recover moneys paid to a licensed contractor even if he or
she was only licensed part of the time.
licensed, should be taken away.
·
Both paragraphs refer to “performance of any act or contract”. Neither refers to supplying of material demanded
and then retained by the Customer.
The court turns the “sword” into a guillotine
It is a
judicial maxim that interpretation must be reasonable (Civil Code § 3542). But in one leading decision and two that
followed it, the Courts decided, on the basis of some discussion in a
legislative committee, that they should interpret the law harshly well beyond
its text. The decisions completely
ignored the MW Erectors caveat
that
“….[C]ourts will not, under such circumstances, extend the harsh
sanction of forfeiture beyond the bounds set by the Legislature absent a
showing that such a result is essential to effectuate the statute's protective
purposes.”
There was no showing
that the reasonable purpose of ensuring contractors were licensed in their
field was achieved, by allowing the retroactive economic destruction of those
who began a job while unlicensed regardless of their skill and benefit to the
customer. Yet in Alatriste the appellate court says:
“In short, those …who have paid may recover all
compensation delivered. Thus, unlicensed contractors are not able to avoid the
full measure of the [statutory scheme’s] civil penalties by … retaining
progress payments relating to completed phases of the construction.”
And
further
… that in enacting section 7031(b), the Legislature specifically intended to permit full recovery
even if the hiring party had actual knowledge the contractor was unlicensed.
Note that the legislation said
nothing of the kind. This view means
that a Customer can hire a temporary unlicensed worker, pay him, and obtain
his services on a job for years, and satisfactory work being fully installed,
get all the compensation paid back. They
may do so even if the worker was licensed much of the time the contract was in
effect. In permitting “full recovery”,
the court also apparently bans equitable counter claim by the worker of quantum
meruit or the defense that the complaint is brought short of fraud but with
“unclean hands”.
The Alatriste court also rejected a
claim for retention of part payment for materials expended, quoting (White
v. Cridlebaugh (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 506, a case decided prior to the
addition of paragraph “b”.
“Cesar’s Designs contends that allowing Alatriste to
obtain reimbursement for materials that remain in his possession is unfair and
“serves no purpose other than punishment.” As noted, the legislative committee
reports show that, in enacting section
7031(b), the Legislature was specifically aware that permitting
reimbursement may result in harsh and unfair results to an individual
contractor and could result in unjust enrichment to a homeowner, but
nonetheless decided that the rule was essential to effectuate the important public
policy of deterring licensing violations and ensuring that all contractors are
licensed. As a judicial body, we are not permitted to second-guess these policy
choices.”
Having a precedent, two
cases enforce the results they claim to think are unjust:
Jeff
Tracy, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 510 quotes Aritriste’s belief the
legislature intended “harsh and unfair” results, as does People v. Walker (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th Supp. 38, 44 [211 Cal.Rptr.3d 829, 834]
The court was not
obligated to read a harsh and unjust into a law where none appeared in the
legislation itself.
Unfortunately what made B&P section 7031 (b) particularly
harsh and unfair was that the Court read into it language that the legislature
as a whole did not put it into writing and may have deliberately omitted. For the Supreme Court of California and the
appellate courts to invoke what was not in the legislation to achieve a result
they observe is harsh, unjust, and a cheat, suggests they really are not doing
their job as courts of justice.
A California Appellate Court
recently rejected the standard of decision used in Alatriste In People v. Munoz, (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 456 the court
stated:
When the
Legislature has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in
another, it should not be implied where excluded. Murder
liability is not imposed on a person who did not act with implied or express
malice, was not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in an underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Cal. Penal Code S 189(e)
Apparently, a passive participant in a felony where
someone is murdered gets more lenient treatment in judicial interpretation than
an unlicensed handyman who unplugs a sink.
The foregoing is social commentary
and should not be understood as legal advice in any case or legal matter.
Peter Liederman (California licensed attorney).
in order to keep some of
its money because the other side had gained at least something from the
contract; or “unclean hands”, because customer had deliberately lured the
tradesman into doing work the customer knew he need not pay for.
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